In 1954 the Supreme Court issued one of its most famous decisions ever in Brown v. Board of Education, ruling that all racial classifications are “suspect” and that the States could no longer segregate black and white public-school students without offending the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the segregated facilities were of equal quality. The decision resonates even to the present day because it somehow “feels” right – surely a just nation cannot countenance the forced segregation of the races. And to its credit, the Brown decision concerns itself with the class of individuals – African-Americans – whom the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect. Yet a moment’s reflection on the true nature of this ruling reveals that it has neither law, reason, ethics, nor morals to recommend it.
In a legal sense, the fatal deficiency of Brown lies in the fact that racial segregation existed during the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 – none of the state or federal legislators approving the Fourteenth Amendment treated the amendment as abolishing this practice. This is one of the main reasons the Supreme Court originally rejected a challenge to segregation in 1896. The language of Brown makes no attempt even to cloak itself with a legal justification; the decision stands as a testament to the Court’s willingness to alter the Constitution’s meaning to suit the Court’s own purposes, and the Court plainly exceeded its legitimate powers to effect a social outcome.
In an ethical sense, Brown fails due to the fraudulent method by which it was procured. When oral arguments were made to the Court in 1952, the majority of the Court members were poised to reject the challenge to public-school segregation as entirely lacking a legal basis. The peerless Justice Felix Frankfurter, however, embarked on a conspiracy to avoid this outcome. He engineered a two-year delay by setting re-argument of the case for 1954. During that additional time he conducted illicit, unethical communications with officials from the Justice Department who had argued in favor of ending segregation. Those communications were aimed at helping the Justice Department to craft written and oral arguments that had a better chance of swaying the other Court members on re-argument, and Frankfurter went so far as to use code names for the other Justices during these communications in order to avoid notice. The delay also secured the death of Chief Justice Fred Vinson and heralded the arrival of new Chief Justice Earl Warren, who never hesitated at twisting the Constitution to his objectives. These serious breaches of legal ethics were revealed in 1987 by one of the Justice officials involved, much to the shock of even Brown’s supporters.
In a rational sense, the decision fails because civil rights are not jeopardized when a State offers a benefit with certain conditions, such as segregation, attached. Education at public expense is not an individual right, but a discretionary benefit, an “act of legislative grace.” States carry no obligation to provide education at taxpayer expense.* If one may refuse to provide a service completely, it follows that one may attach conditions to that service when provided. Otherwise put, since a State may deprive its citizens entirely of taxpayer-financed education, then a State may also deprive its citizens of racially integrated taxpayer-financed education without violating their civil rights. This same logic is employed to deny private citizens a trial by jury -- a right safeguarded in the Seventh Amendment, no less -- in damages lawsuits against the federal government. Courts have reasoned that the federal government is not required to waive its sovereign immunity for such lawsuits, so the federal government may attach the condition of prohibiting trial by jury. So if this reasoning serves to remove an explicit constitutional right, why does it not also serve to remove an extra-constitutional and judicially-created right such as racial integration?
In a moral sense, the decision fails because of its implicit, racist assumption that African-Americans cannot be educated unless mixed with whites. Not long after Brown was decided, the famous author Zora Neale Hurston took stock of how the Court’s ruling affected members of her race as well as of how it tarnished the rule of law in general:
If there are not adequate Negro schools in Florida, and there is some residual, some inherent and unchangeable quality in white schools, impossible to duplicate anywhere else, then I am the first to insist that Negro children of Florida be allowed to share this boon. But if there are adequate Negro schools and prepared instructors and instruction, then there is nothing different except the presence of white people.
For this reason, I regard the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court as insulting rather than honoring my race. Since the days of the never-to-be-sufficiently-deplored Reconstruction [of the South following the Civil War], there has been current the belief that there is no greater delight to Negroes than the physical association with whites. The doctrine of the white mare. Those familiar with the habits of mules are aware that any mule, if not restrained, will automatically follow a white mare. Dishonest mule-traders made money out of this knowledge in the old days. . . .
But what if it is contemplated to do away with the two party system and arrive at Govt by administrative decree? No questions allowed and no information given out from the administrative dept. We could get more rulings on the same subject and more far-reaching any day. It pays to weight every saving and action, however trivial as indicating a trend.
In the ruling on segregation, the unsuspecting nation might have witnessed a trial-balloon. A relatively safe one, since it is sectional and on a matter not likely to arouse other sections of the nation to support of the South. If it goes off fairly well, a precedent has been established. Govt by fiat can replace the constitution. You don’t have to credit me with too much intelligence and penetration, just so you watch carefully and think.
Meanwhile, personally, I am not delighted. I am not persuaded and elevated by the white mare technique. Negro schools in the state are in very good shape and on the improve. . . .
It is well known that I have no sympathy nor respect for the "Tragedy of color" school of thought among us, whose fountain-head is the pressure group concerned in this court ruling. I can see no tragedy in being too dark to be invited to a white school social affair. The Supreme Court would have pleased me more if they had concerned themselves about enforcing the compulsory education provisions for Negroes in the South as is done for white children. . . .
Hurston’s remarks proved prophetic, for it soon became obvious that the Court had larger designs than merely ending legally-enforced segregation in the public schools. Frustrated that families were choosing not to commingle their children when given the opportunity, the Court began forcibly integrating public schools so as to achieve the façade of racial harmony that the Court had in mind. So the Court, after having leapt away from the Constitution when issuing the Brown decision, now leapt away from Brown itself and engaged in the very brand of racial-engineering that the States had been accused of. Having donned the mantle of super-legislature, the Court (and the lower federal courts) took on political functions such as re-drawing school-district lines, ordering the busing of students far from their homes, and even usurping the power of taxation in order to support judicially-inspired school plans.
Instead of producing harmony, Brown and its progeny produced strife. Whites pulled their children from the public schools and fled urban areas in droves, while blacks were left behind in schools far worse than the ones their ancestors had attended during the days of segregation. Brown’s sad legacy is a prolonged and aggravated alienation between blacks and whites, making blacks suspicious of whites and whites resentful of blacks. If the Court had obeyed the Constitution and allowed society to progress at its own pace towards that wonderful day when the races could respect one another, then that day quite likely would have arrived much sooner.
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* Public education as we currently know it is a fairly recent phenomenon. For the majority of American history, spanning from the colonial days up through the nineteenth century, education was not viewed as a primarily governmental function. New England “reformers” such as Massachusetts politician Horace Mann promoted governmental involvement in education as a means of advancing secular thought and uniformity of curriculum, taking as their model the Prussian educational system. When we consider the “progress” of public education in America since that time – the politicization of curricula, the spiraling costs, and the degeneration of teaching standards – it is more accurate to characterize public education as a legislative curse than a blessing.